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Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive
Sentences: A Comparative Study
Gerhard 0. W. Mueller' and Fr6 Le Poole"*
The American criminal statutes do not generally establish criteria to
be followed by the trial judges in sentencing; therefore, the right of
judicial review of sentences as a matter of law is largely unavailable
due to the almost total exercise of judicial discretion in the sentencing
process: The authors will examine and evaluate the continental system
in which the criminal codes generally provide sentencing guidelines,
thus enabling sentence review to be obtained as a matter of law.

I.

EMERGmcE oF SENTENCE REvIEW

Classical penology was conceived in France in the eighteenth century,1 and then eclipsed all over the world in the nineteenth, when
Lombroso conjured up the picture of the born criminal. It was finally
laid to rest in the United States in the twentieth century. Its basic

tenet had been simple enough: the legislature in its infinite wisdom
would seek and find the appropriate punishment for every crime.

This can be accomplished if a crime is defined narrowly enough, perhaps by the creation of subcategories of that crime, so as to encompass
all potential perpetrators who will each incur the same amount of
criminal guilt. All perpetrators in the same subcategory are then
entitled to the exact same amount of punishment in expiation of their
criminal guilt. This system, so it was thought, ideally adjusts the
* Professor of Law, Director, Comparative Criminal Law Project, New York University School of Law. Ploen College, Germany, 1947; Keil University Faculty of
Law, 1949; J. D. University of Chicago Law School, 1953; L.L.M. Columbia University, 1955. This article is based upon a study made by the authors as advisors
to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and is a follow-up of Professor Mueller's
American study. See Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but
Excessive Sentences, 15 VA"r. L. REv. 671 (1962).
* Research Assistant, Comparative Criminal Law Project, New York University
School of Law.
1. See Canals, Classicism, Positivism and Social Defense, 50 J. Camn.
541 (1960).
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punishment to achieve a balance between the crime and its harm
and the criminal and his guilt, without going into undue subtleties
of minute variations in the guilt of perpetrators in the same subcategory. Consequently the codes of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries could satisfy themselves with defining and categorizing
crimes in terms of the harm created and the specific mens rea in
question.
The punishments in such a scheme of things, being almost entirely
designed to serve the goals of retribution and deterrence of all nondescript members of a class, could be almost entirely stereotyped.
A system which does not admit of variation among members of its
various categories of perpetrators needs little variability of its punishments. Therefore, whether in an American state or European nation
in the nineteenth century, nearly all first degree murderers were rewarded with death, and nearly all thieves received a stereotyped
penitentiary sentence. To the extent that the need for variability
was recognized, such variability-like its historical ancestor, the benefit of clergy-was regarded primarily as a matter of mercy to be dispensed by the sovereign. However, in nearly all countries the legislative scheme of crimes and punishments did permit a minimum of
variation, usually in terms of alternate punishments, or sometimes
regarding the quantum of punishment. "The duration and quantity of
[fine and imprisonment] must, says Blackstone, frequently vary from
the aggravations, or otherwise of the offence, the quality and condition of the parties, and from innumerable other circumstances.... "2
In a system of relatively stereotyped punishments for static guilt
and harm, practically no question of reviewability of sentence can
arise as long as each sentence is within the narrow legislative frame.
However, such an arrangement could not survive a recognition that
the infinite variety of subjective and objective factors, which exist
in the personality of every offender, and in the harm and guilt, must
be reflected in the criminal sanction. Likewise, the criminal sanction
must be adjusted to serve the needs of a variety of aims of penal
policy. While the new variants in the personality of the perpetrator
and in the aims of penal policy were first scientifically recognized and
stated in Europe, especially by the Italian positivists, it was in this
country that the first significant breaks with the established stereotyped and static penal scheme occurred. Among the devices of the
new penology we find the following: (1) the mini-max statute,
which allows the court to choose an appropriate sentence within a
framework of a minimum and maximum sentence provided by the
2. Frese v. State, 23 Fla. 267, 270, 2 So. 1, 2 (1887), upholding fine provision
without maximum as constitutional.
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legislature; (2) the alternate sentence, providing for either one form
of punishment or another, or both; (3) additional sentences, e.g.,
forfeiture of office, added to imprisonment; (4) the open-ended sentence, which allows the court to individually fix either the minimum
or the maximum and to make the other limit to the sentence depend
on subsequent factors; (5) good conduct and good time provisions,
resulting in deductions from initial punishment; (6) parole rights and
duties; (7) probation; and (8) an infinite variety of commitments to
special institutions.
With such a potpourri of penal dispositions available, the modem
judge needs a degree of guidance unimagined in the nineteenth century. Now, a significant choice has to be made in every case, a
choice which was generally not possible a few decades ago. Therefore, it seems that a legal machinery is needed to guard against the
wrong choice. How does the law usually protect the defendant against
a wrong choice on the part of a judge? It grants appellate review.
But our system has not yet adapted itself to the novelty. Appellate
review is largely unavailable to question the exercise of sentencing
discretion. While a system without appellate review of criminal
sentences was workable and lawful in the nineteenth century, it can
be neither proper nor lawful at the present time. It can be attributable only to chance or ignorance that the American system, which
permits no review of judicial choice in sentencing, has not been declared unconstitutional.
Elsewhere we have demonstrated that a movement is underfoot
to provide American convicts with a machinery for the review of
criminal sentences alleged to be excessive, though lawful. From the
modest beginning of a single American jurisdiction which granted
such review in 1858, we now have reached the point at which such
remedies are available in fifteen jurisdictions, albeit on a very limited
scale.3 It does not take much courage to predict that in the foreseeable future, all American jurisdictions will adopt sentence review
procedures.
II. ThE LACKaNG CRTE=rA OF SENTENCE RE

Ew AT

Howm

While the need for reviewing the exercise of judicial choice in
sentencing may be quite apparent, what makes one pause is the
lack of criteria by which we can measure the propriety of a given
choice. It must be noted that we are here interested primarily in
the judicial choice. There is also a legislative choice, which is subject to review. Thus, the constitutionality of a statute permitting
3. Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences,
15 VA.1rD L. REv. 671 (1962).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VorL. 21

any prison sentence from one day to life and/or a fine of any magnitude for the crime of shoplifting may well be subject to some doubt.
Indeed, the supreme courts of the nineteenth century at first were
considerably hesitant to uphold as constitutional, against charges of
uncertainty and vagueness, statutes allowing penological variety which
seemed to permit the exercise of judicial choice, unguided by fixed
legislative criteria. For all practical purposes, the legislatures have
not provided the judiciary with criteria to guide them in exercising
sentencing discretion. If there are no criteria to begin with, how can
it be charged that the wrong criteria have been used? Our system
has muddled along with vague expressions like "the sound exercise
of judicial discretion," "recognition of the crime and the criminal,"
"the gravity of the deed," "the guilt of the perpetrator," and "the
protection of society." None of these slogans is law. Appellate review, however, has been customarily available for judicial violations
of law-not slogans, and it is arguable that slogans are not entitled
to appellate review.
Elsewhere we have endeavored to state the real criteria which have
prompted courts to play with the legislative choices in sentencing
and which we found to be conditioned by the infinite variety of
life, manifested in the perpetrator and his crime, but always limited
by the scope of the penal purposes. This limitation, designed to protect society from initial or repeated harm through crime, extends to
vindication of the law, retribution for the wrong committed, penitence
of the perpetrator, neutralization of the still dangerous actor, deterrence of potential wrongdoers, and above all, resocialization of the
offender. 4 While these observations may properly describe reality,
they are not positive law. There is a need for appellate review of
criminal sentences. But upon what criteria should such review proceed and to what end?
To solve these perplexing problems we have turned to the experiences of other members of the family of civilized nations. While their
experiences are not likely to be dispositive of our problems, they are
likely to be helpful, for all nations are endeavoring only to find the
most appropriate method of insuring the establishment and continuance of the most effective sentencing policies. Although these
problems appear predominantly theoretical at first glance, they have
the potential of becoming explosively practical in the not-too-distant
future. The Supreme Court of the United States recently held unconstitutional for vagueness a statute which permitted the jury to
impose costs upon an acquitted criminal defendant, without guidance
4. Mueller, Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv. 58-98 (1966).
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as to when costs were or were not to be imposed.5 By dictum the
majority added that the distribution of varying punishments based
solely upon the reprehensibility of a convicted offender would certainly violate the due process clause. Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, contended that much of the reasoning in the opinion cast grave
constitutional doubt upon the settled practice of many states to allow
the jury in its unguided discretion to determine the nature and degree
of punishment to be imposed. 6 Also, consideration must be given to
the problem of the judge's use of his unguided discretion in the
sentencing process. It appears that in the near future sentencing
criteria and the aims of penal policy may become matters of positive
law and, therefore, subject to appellate review as questions of law.
By looking at the advanced continental experience, we may be able
to delineate the course that we should follow.

III.

Cvm LAw CouNms
As in our system, continental code provisions contain sentencing
alternatives and sentence ranges. Many foreign codes set some guidelines for the exercise of sentencing discretions, both in the penal provisions and in special sentencing sections of the more general parts
of the codes. These sentencing frames and criteria have become
matters of positive law, and, like all other matters of law, are subject to appellate review. However, there are many code and statutory provisions which contain no criteria for guiding sentencing
choice; frequently these are found in cases where a crime category
(e.g., homicide) has been subdivided into minute sub-categories
which are descriptive of different offender types. Thus, the old, but
still subsisting German Penal Code provides in section 211 that
"murder shall be punished by confinement in a penitentiary for life."
This stereotype sentence for all murderers is understandable only
if it is considered that this provision also describes a murderer in
terms of specific personality characteristics and that the murder provision is followed by eight subsequent provisions on homicide which
are descriptive of other stereotypes, including: manslaughter (section 212); manslaughter under extenuating circumstances (section
213); mercy killing (section 216); infanticide (section 217); genocide
(section 220a); negligent homicide (section 222); and assault and
battery with fatal consequences (section 226). Each of these variations from the basic form of criminal homicide carries its own penal
sanction which differs from that of the basic form. Some of these
penal sanctions also allow a certain amount of variation (e.g., for
GENERA

ScHEmm IN

5. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).

6. Id. at 405.
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"mitigating circumstances," as in section 216.2, or for "serious cases,"
as in section 212.2).7
By far the most frequent sentencing variables which the continental
codes place at the disposition of judges are in terms of minimummaximum sentences and alternative sentences. For example, under
the Italian Penal Code the punishment for mercy killing is "confinement in a penitentiary from six to fifteen years."8 As regards imprisonment, the legislature has sometimes set only maximum 9 or only minimum terms 10 for each offense. Under statutes with open-ended provisions, the judge has to find the limit for the open-end in the penal
provisions of the General Part of his code. For example, the Dutch
Code provides: "Temporary imprisonment may be imposed for a
term of at least one day and not exceeding fifteen years ....
"I'
Under some codes the minimum and maximum standards may be
extended in case of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, which
may be of either a general or a more limited nature. 12 Some codes/
statutes set further standards for judges by establishing what might
be termed "judicial arithmetics." 13 For example the Spanish Penal
Code presents a veritable "price list" of criminal wrongs by giving
consideration to a multitude of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, which is, in effect, a catalogue of human emotions (see
Appendix A.).
We do not regard it as possible or desirable to emulate the Spanish
example. Apart from the hopelessness of any effort to achieve completeness in the list of factors to be considered in sentencing, the
attribution of weight measures to these human emotions amounts
to an objectification of applied psychology, which is totally at odds
with an individualized system of criminal justice, administered by
relatively sophisticated judges and correctional officers, rather than
automatons.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR AND EVIDENCE OF JUDICIAL DIsCRETION

Within the legal framework described and with variations to be
noted, sentencing in civil law countries has remained a matter of
7. All citations of the German Penal Code are to G. MUELLER & BUECENTFIAL
(transl.), THE GERM AN PENAL CODE (Vol. 4, American Series of Foreign Penal Codes,
1961).
8. ITALIAN CRMsNAL CODE (hereinafter IT. C. PEN.) art. 579 (1930).
9. E.g., in the Netherlands.
10. E.g., IT. C. PEN. art. 575.
11. DuTcH PENAL CODE art. 10 (1881).
12. Compare, e.g., DuTcH PENAL CODE art. 44 with art. 288; see also note 8 supra
and accompanying text.
13. See Scusnmy, Dm STRAFzumEsSUNG IN RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER DABSTELLUNG
124 (1961).
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some judicial discretion. The legislature, however, may provide guidelines. Many criminal codes (e.g., the Brazilian, Bulgarian, Danish,
Greek, Swedish, Swiss and Yugoslav Codes and the German Draft
Penal Code) tell the judge what factors should be taken into account
when imposing sentence. Different legislatures have shown a fair
amount of agreement on this subject. Factors frequently mentioned
are: the dangerousness of the offense and its harmful consequences;
the motives of the offender; the intensity of his criminal intent or
criminal negligence; his previous criminal record; his personal and
economic conditions; and his behavior during and after the act (see
Appendix B).
From the nature of the different factors to be taken into account
in sentencing, it is apparent that punishment is not meant to serve
one goal exclusively. Rather, multiple goals-such as retribution, deterrence (both general and specific prevention), and rehabilitationseem to have their place. Some legislatures seem to express a preference for one of these goals, while others allow the judge to
determine which goal should be primarily considered in a specific
case. The latter is the position of those codes which contain specific
provisions on the goals of punishment (e.g., the Soviet Union and
Czechoslovak Codes) (see Appendix C). These lists of goals are
not dissimilar to those compiled by American criminologists and are
comparable to the American Model Penal Code provision in point.'4
All such lists are subject to the criticism that they remain codified
social science and philosophy and are scarcely subject to empirical
validation as to their effectiveness. Nevertheless, the codification of
correctional policy may be a necessary first step toward effective
administration of the ultimate preventive goal of all penal
judicial
5
law. 1
All correctional policy exhortations in penal codes are bound to
remain ineffectual until there is evidence of the extent to which such
exhortations have influenced judicial choice in sentencing. Consequently, in most European countries trial judges are obligated to write
detailed opinions justifying their sentences in terms of the codified
correctional policy.16 A judge who fails to give evidence that he
abided by the codified standards is likely to have his sentences set
aside on motion of either party.1 The Italian Supreme Court has
14. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Official Draft 1966).
15. See Mueller, Punishment, Corrections and the Law, supra note 4, at 86.
16. See, e.g., DuTcH CODE OF CmIMNAL PROCEDURE (hereinafter WvSv) art. 359;
FRENcH CODE OF CRMUvNAL PRoCEDURE (hereinafter FR. C. PRo. PEN.) arts. 485, 543;
GERMAN CODE OF CRm NAL PROCEDuRE (hereinafter S-GB) art. 267.
17. See, e.g., WvSv art. 359; ITALrAN CODE OF CanvNAL PROCEDURE (hereinafter
It. D. C. PRo. PEN.) art. 574.
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ruled expressly that it will not accept standardized or clich6 formulas
adhering only formally to the codified standard. 8
V. APPELLATE RvEw OF SENTENCES
Most continental countries do not distinguish between appellate
review of convictions and sentences. They do, however, distinguish
between appellate review on matters of fact and law and on matters
of law only. The former is primarily meant to serve the purpose of
correction of errors of the trial court; while the latter primarily assures the uniform interpretation of the law. Generally, appeal solely
on matters of law is available only if all other appellate rights have
been exhausted. An appeal concerning matters of fact and law may
result in a review of the sentence. This is due to the fact that European codes, unlike American statutes, prescribe sentencing rules
which must be respected by the trial judge. Also, in some countries,
the appellate courts interpret 'law" broadly and, consequently, have
an extensive power of review.
In some countries, the system of appeal differs from that just
described. Norwegian law provides that a so-called "appeal proper"
may be directed against a sentence for the reason, among others,
that the punishment is not appropriate because it is too severe or too
lenient.' 9 This indicates that such appeals may be brought by either
prosecution or defense;20 however, it is not likely that a defendant
will appeal a sentence he considers too lenient. The prosecutor, who
is legally obligated to see that the law is properly applied, may appeal a sentence which is too severe, as well as one he considers too
lenient. So as not to discourage sentence appeal by convicts, many
codes provide that "the judgment may not be amended to the prejudice of the defendant, insofar as kind and amount of punishment are
concerned, if the appeal was initiated by the defendant alone."2' 1
This doctrine, which is referred to as the prohibition of reformatio
in pejus, has no applicability when the sentence is appealed by the
prosecution for being too lenient. In that case, the appellate tribunal
could either increase or decrease the punishment. This is also true
where both defendant and prosecutor have appealed the sentence,
as long as the sentence increase is not the result of the defendant's
appeal. In the Netherlands the punishment may be increased even
if only the defendant has appealed, provided that all judges of the
18. Court of Cassation, Jan. 30, 1935 (La giustizia penale 1935, 310).
19. NoRwEGIA N MumTRsY or JusICE, ADMNmSTRATION OF JusncE rN NORWAY 80

(1957).
20. Compare Fn. C. PRO. PEN. art. 497, with WvSv art. 404, and STGB f1 296.
21. STGB ff 331; STGB art. 358; Fi. C. PRO. PEN. art. 515; WvSv art. 424.
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appellate court concur.22 Finally there is some doubt in Europe, as
there is in this country, 3 as to what in fact constitutes an increase
of punishment (i.e., an amendment of the sentence prejudicial to
the defendant). Thus, while both the German and Dutch courts

hold a longer suspendedsntenceto-be heavier than a shorter nonsuspended sentence,2 it,'can be doubted that the defendants agree.
VI. PERMISSIBILIT (iN

SCOPE OF APPEAL ON FACT AND LAw

Most European nations permit, as of right, an appeal on fact and
law. In France and the Netherlands, an appeal lies from practically
all criminal judgments, except those involving very small penalties.25
However, in France no such appeal is possible from the judgment of
a jury court,6 since there, as formerly in England, 7 the judgment of
the jury is regarded as unimpeachable. Also, in France no fact-andlaw appeal is possible from the judgments of a number of special
courts.2

In the Netherlands and some other countries, a defendant

may not appeal a judgment of acquittal rendered "for lack of evidence," despite the fact that such a judgment leaves him under a
shadow of suspicion, which he may wish to have removed by the
more favorable judgment of acquittal because of "innocence."- In
Germany, the only difference between the two types of acquittal
lies in the availability of compensation for detention suffered pending
trial for those acquitted because of "innocence."3 0 The German Code
22. WvSv art. 424.
23. See State v. Fisher, 126 W. 1A. 117, 27 S.E.2d 581 (1943).
24. Oberlandesgericht (hereinafter OLG) Oldenburg (Monatschrift fir Deutsches
Recht 55, 436); Hoge Raad (hereinafter H.R.) December 18, 1933 (Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie 1934, 298).
25. FR. C. Pno. PEN. art. 546; DuTccH LAW ON COURT On.iAazA-nox (hereinafter
WET R.O.) 44.
26. FR. C. PRo. PEN. art. 370. But cases brought before the Jury Court have been
evaluated in the pre-trial stage by two judicial authorities, the investigating magistrate
and the Chamber of Indictments.
27. In England, before the introduction of the Criminal Appeal Act in 1907, there
was no appeal as of right from the verdict of a jury in a criminal trial. Only in very
few cases did the trial judge decide to reserve a point of law for consideration by
the Court for Crown Cases Reserved which could quash the conviction. Under the
1907 Act (§ 3), a person convicted on indictment may appeal against conviction as
of right if a question of law alone is involved. If his appeal is based on a question
of fact or mixed law and fact, he may appeal only after having obtained the leave
of the Court of Appeal or of the judge who tried the case. Appeal against sentences
is permissible only on leave of the Court of Appeal. Compare: INTERDEPARTM ENTAL
COMM. ON THE CouRT OF Cnrm. App., REPORT, CmD., No. 2755, at 3, 6 (1965).
28. Court of State Security, Military Courts, etc. See STxANr-LEvAssEUn, PROCiURE
PRNALE 18 (1964).

29. WvSv art. 404; STGB § 267.V distinguishes between the two kinds of acquittals,
but the distinction has no bearing on the permissibility of appeal. (See STGB § 313).
30. See German Law Concerning Compensation for Innocently Suffered Preliminary
Detention of July 4, 1904.
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of Criminal Procedure, which is generally regarded as providing the
most limited appeal on fact and law (Berufung), only allows such
appeal against judgments of some of the least significant criminal
courts. This results in allowing a defendant tried in a minor court
for a minor offense to have a fact-and-law appeal and a pure-law
appeal; while a defendant tried in a major court for a major offense
is limited to an appeal of law only? 1 This is regarded as one of the
most serious shortcomings of the German Code of Criminal Procedure. 2
Where partial appeals (i.e., those restricted to a single issue) are
permissible, the judgment unlike that of the general appeal, is subject
to review only insofar as it has been attacked. 3 Ordinarily it is not
advisable for a defendant to lodge a partial appeal, since this may
be held to bar the appellate court from amending the judgment in
the defendant's favor with respect to matters not called to its attention. Thus, the German Supreme Court has held that where a
convict appeals solely on the ground that his sentence is excessive,
the court has no jurisdiction to reverse and enter a judgment of acquittal for lack of criminal responsibility 4 Where the defendant
chooses to appeal the sentence only, it has been held that an appeal
may not be limited to the type of punishment, and therefore, type
and duration of punishment are also regarded as being reviewable.3
Thus, when not limited by a partial application, the reviewing court
will proceed to a re-examination of the entire case. It may receive
new evidence,- or it may use only the evidence before the trial court
which has become a matter of record. 7 If the court considers the
appeal well-founded, it will either render a new judgment or remand
the case for a new trial. Rarely will it remand the case to the trial
court whose judgment was attacked.3 The German courts have held
themselves competent to review such questions as whether a commitment to an institution for cure and care was justified3 and whether
the lower court had been right in cancelling the defendant's
driver's
40
license or in imposing other supplementary penalties.
31. STGB II 312-13.
32. See

HmscHBERG,

DAs

AmxmuAmscHE

uiND

DEmrscHE

S

VRAHmIAnEN

(1963).
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

FR. C. Nao. Pnr. art. 509; STGB 1327.
Reichsgericht (hereinafter RG) (Deutsche Rechtszeitung 22 (1930)).
RG (Juristische Rundschau 1927 nr. 667).
FR. C. PRo. PEN. art. 513; WvSv art. 414; STGB ff 323.
Fit. C. PRo. Parq. art. 513; WvSv art. 422; STGB ff 325.
FR. C. PRo. PzN. art 514-20; WvSv art. 423; SiGB II 328.
Compare ff 42b GaR.mA P AXLCODE.
Court Freiburg (Deutsche Rechtszeitung 140 (1941)).

33
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Pmuissmrmirry AND SCOPE OF APPEAL ON LAw ONLY

In practically all continental countries final criminal judgments
are subject to appeal on matters of law. However, there are a few
exceptions, such as acquittals rendered by French jury courts4 ' and
judgments rendered which acquit for lack of evidence or are appealable by another remedy of which the defendant has not availed
himself. 42 If the appellate court finds that the law appeal is wellfounded, it may reverse the judgment attacked, or it may decide the
43
matter itself, if it can do so without a further inquiry into the facts.
Generally, however, it will remand the matter to a trial court other
than the one which rendered the judgment attacked. 44 In Germany
and the Netherlands, the court to which the case is remanded is
bound to respect the higher court's decision.45 In an appeal solely on
law, the scope of inquiry is much narrower than in an appeal on fact
and law. 6 The court is bound to the facts as stated in the judgment
below and the review is limited to points listed in the petition for
review. 47 As stated previously, appeal on law only includes sentences
which under American law would not be reviewable.
In Switzerland and Austria the appellate courts hold themselves
incompetent to review the determination of punishment, as long as
the judge has exercised his discretion within the legal framework,
but in case of clear arbitrariness, a sentence might be reversed.4
Thus, these two alpine countries follow the same procedure as the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.0 According to German theory, the
discretion of the trial judge is not subject to review in an appeal on
matters of law.50 But a judgment and sentence are subject to such
a review if the standards of law have not been properly applied by
the judge. The following are examples of successful reviews of legally
41. FR. C. PRo PEN. art. 572.
42. WET R.O. 96; WvSv art. 430. The rule is otherwise in Germany, where a
defendant may waive his initial right to appeal on fact-and-law and proceed im-

mediately to his appeal on law only (so-called "leap revision"). See STGB § 335.
43. STGB f 353-54; FR. C. PRO. PEN. art. 617; WvSv art. 441. Compare MiNKENHoF,

N

anuA~wE STRAFVORDEmNG 296 (1948).
44. FR. C. PRO. PEN. art. 609 et seq.; WvSv art. 441; STGB It 354.
45. In France this is not the case. If, however, after reversal of a first decree or

final judgment, the second decree or second final judgment, rendered in the same case
between the same parties, is attacked on the same grounds as the first, it will be
decided by the united divisions of the Supreme Court. If a reversal results, the court
to which the matter is remanded is bound to respect the decision of the united divisions, unless the decree rendered by these is different from that passed by the

Criminal Division in the first place. FR. C. PRo. PEN. art. 619.
46. FR. C. PRo. PEN. art. 567; WET R.O. 99; STGB ff 337.
47. STGB ff 353.

48. Compare Scmrenr supra note 13 at 29 & 43 (1961).
49. Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
50. KERN,STRAFVERFArmENSREc-T 208 (1959).
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"improper" sentences which nevertheless had been within the statutory framework: the trial judge had only taken into account deterrence without considering the retributive guilt of the offender;5 1
the punishment imposed though within the legal framework was not
proportionate to the guilt of the offender and, in that sense was
excessive; 52 the trial court had not considered all aspects of the offense
and the offender by taking into account all essential goals of punishment; 53 and the maximum penalty had been imposed, although it was
"obvious" that the punishment should have been closer to the minimum.M
In Norway, the Supreme Court has full authority to reverse sentences when the punishment is too lenient or too severe, that is,
excessive in either direction. Nevertheless, the Norwegian judge is
given a wide discretion in sentencing.5 Extracts from the Norwegian
Supreme Court decisions show that the Court does not limit itself
to reviewing sentences which are truly outrageous, but in fact does
sometimes substitute its own discretion for that of the trial judge (see
Appendix D). The Supreme Court considers the particulars of each
offender and offense and decides what should be the principal objective of punishment in that particular case. If there is a reasonable
possibility of rehabilitation, the Court tends to let this consideration
prevail over reasons of general prevention. The Norwegian judges,
as those of all other nations which have not catalogued the objectives
of punishment, are ultimately driven to finding the right criteria in
their own internalized notions of the proper objectives of criminal

justice.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This study of continental schemes of appellate review of legal but
excessive sentences has the reassuring effect of informing us that we
do not stand alone with our problems. The benefit of comparative
study extends beyond theoretical reassurance; it reveals that continental law, more readily than ours, regards a proper criminal sentence
within the legislative framework to be a matter of law, and therefore
51. RG 76, 325; OLG Freiburg (Hbchstrichterliche Entscheidungen in Strafsachen
2, 112).
52. OHGsT 1, 174. Compare State v. O'Dell, 240 Iowa 1157, 39 N.W.2d 100
(1949). But within this range of factors the trial judge's discretion is decisive. See
OHGsr 2, 145. Compare State v. Sullivan, 241 Wis. 276, 5 N.W.2d 798 (1942).
53. OGHsT 2, 94.
54. Bundesgerichtshof 2 StR 45, 50. Compare DALCKE, STRAFRECUT UND STRAVwm
a
1365 (1955); L6WE-ROSENmBEOr, STAFPnozEssoRnNUNc
1301 et seq.

(1962).
55. Compare NoRWEGIAN PENAL CODE 52-65.
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reviewable. The difference between review of an ordinary error of
law and an error in legal sentence is one of standards for determining
the error. While our legislatures have rarely seen fit to provide the
judiciary with legal criteria for the imposition of legally proper
sentences, many European legislatures have provided their judges
with such criteria. These criteria are of two kinds: (1) the recognized
aims of penal-correctional policy; and (2) the proper criteria by which
the perpetrator and his deed should be evaluated.
We are not convinced that any foreign code has provided a truly
acceptable list of penal-correctional aims. Nevertheless, even a hodgepodge of stated aims, as that contained in the Model Penal Code of
the American Law Institute, can usefully serve as a convenient guide,
the total disregard of which would be considered illegal. In any
event, in accordance with continental experience, a statement of penalcorrectional aims appear to us to be a necessary step toward developing a sound sentencing and sentence review system. We are totally
unimpressed by the efforts of some nations in cataloguing the enormous range of human emotions and character. This approach, designed to provide a legal (and thus reviewable) framework in which
the trial court may evaluate the crime and the perpetrator in imposing sentence, views man, including both the judge and the judged,
as a mechanical monster.
If the European experience teaches us anything, it is that an imaginative, free-thinking judge, properly guided by the codified basic
penal-correctional objectives, must be trusted to find the right sentence. Since the sentence is then a matter of law, it is subject to
review and revision by an appellate court which has its own criteria
and approach for interpreting the legal goals of punishment and correction. These appellate court interpretations make precedent and
build tradition. Several European judges have assured us in personal
conversation that no one factor is as strong a sentence review criterion
as the custom of the court.
Criteria and custom have been developed through appellate decisions in several European countries (Norway and Germany have
been cited as leading examples). While we have cited Norway as
a leading example of an enlightened practice, Norway also acquaints
us with an all-too-liberal law of sentence review. We wonder whether
an appellate court's view of a sentence is truly more expert than that
of a trial judge. It strikes us that the proper limitation for sentence
review may have been stated by the English Court of Criminal
Appeal:
In the first place, this Court does not alter a sentence which is the subject
of an appeal merely because the members of the Court might have passed
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a different sentence. The trial judge has seen the prisoner and heard his
history and any witness to character he may have chosen to call. It is only
when a sentence appears to err in principle that the Court will alter it.
If a sentence is excessive or inadequate to such an extent as to satisfy this
Court that when it was passed there was a failure to apply the right principles, then this Court will intervene.-%

It is doubtful whether the appellate court should be empowered to
increase the sentence. In Europe, an increased sentence usually prevails only on an appeal by the prosecutor, a procedure which is not
available in the United States. In England, the Court of Criminal
Appeal has such power, but it has recently been proposed that this
power, which was rarely used, be abolished. In 1963, out of 1976
applications for leave to appeal received by the English Court, the
sentence was reduced in one hundred forty-five, quashed in thirteen
and increased in only six cases. In England, as elsewhere, it is felt
that an increase in sentence on appeal is basically unfair. Nor is
there any evidence that the existence of the power to increase a sentence on appeal serves as a substantial barrier to frivolous appeals.5
If, per chance, there are policy reasons-which we cannot detectfavoring the existence of the power to increase sentences on appeal,
we would urge that the Dutch practice, requiring unanimity of all
judges of the appellate court, be followed.
56. Regina v. Ball, 35 Crim. App. 164, as quoted by INTERDEPARATMENTAL COMsMITrEE ON THE COuVT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL, REPORT, CMsD. No. 2755,

at 43 (1965).

57. Id. at 42-47.

Appendices
APPENDIX A
PROVISIONS ON SENTENCING TAKEN FROM THE SPANISH PENAL CODE
(1870, modified in 1944)
CHAPTER III: MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Article 9
The following are mitigating circumstances:
1. All those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when the requirements needed for
complete exemption from liability in each situation did not concur.
2. Intoxication which is neither habitual nor self-induced for purposes of committing
an offense.
3. Minority below the age of eighteen years.
4. The fact that the criminal harm caused is more severe than the perpetrator
intended.
5. Sufficient antecedent provocation or threats on the part of the victim.
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6. When the act was committed in proximate vindication of a grievous offense
against the actor, his spouse, his ascendants or descendants, his legitimate, natural or
adoptive brothers, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees.
7. The fact that the deed was motivated by moral, altruistic or patriotic reasons of
considerable importance.
8. The fact that the deed was committed under such powerful excitement, as to
cause rage or loss of self-control.
9. The fact that the perpetrator, prior to having knowledge of the institution of
judicial proceedings against him, and moved by his own voluntary repentance, proceeded to make amends in whole or in part for the harm caused, to offer satisfaction
to the victim, or to confess his infraction to the authorities.
10. And lastly, any other circumstance of like significance to the above.
CHAPTER IV: AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Article 10
The following are aggravating circumstances. The fact that:
1. The act was committed with perfidy. Perfidy is present whenever the perpetrator
commits an offense against persons through such means, forms or kinds of execution
which directly and particularly insure the success of the criminal act without those risks
to his own person which would result from the defensive action the victim might otherwise take;
2. The offense is committed for a price, reward or promise;
3. The offense is committed by means of flood, fire, poison, explosion, destruction of
an aircraft, grounding of a ship or other willful damage, derailment of locomotives,
or by any other highly destructive means;
4. The offense is committed by means of printed matter, radio broadcasting or other
means facilitating publicity;
5. The ordinary harm of the offense is willfully aggravated by causing additional
harm unnecessary for the commission of the offense;
6. The act is perpetrated with known premeditation;
7. Trickery, fraud, or disguise are employed;
8. Advantage is taken of superior strength or through the use of means which
weaken the victim's defense;
9. The victim's confidence is misused;
10. The perpetrator makes use of his official position;
11. The crime is committed during a fire, shipwreck or other calamity or misfortune;
12. The offense is committed with the aid of armed companions or persons who
provide or secure impunity;
13. The act is committed at night, in secluded locations, or by a gang; a gang is
present whenever three or more armed persons jointly engage in the commission of an
offense;
14. The perpetrator is a general recidivist. A general recidivist is one, who at the
time of the commission of the deed, has previously been sentenced for another offense
which carries an equal or greater punishment, or for two or more offenses which carry
a lighter punishment.
15. The perpetrator is a specific recidivist. A specific recidivist is one who, at the
time of the commission of the deed, has already been (executorily) sentenced for one
or more offenses within the same Title of this Code.
16. The deed was committed against public authority or with disrespect toward the
dignity, age or sex of the victim, or in the victim's home, provided the victim did not
provoke the act.
17. The deed was committed in a sacred place.
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CHAPTER V: CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MAY EITHER MITIGATE OR
AGGRAVATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, DEPENDING ON THE FACTS
Article 11
The fact that the victim is the perpetrator's spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural or adoptive brother, or a relative by affinity within the same degrees of
relationship, may attenuate or aggravate his criminal liability depending on the nature,
motives or effects of the offense.
Article 61*
Whenever the punishment prescribed by law is composed of three degrees, the
Courts shall impose it according to the following rules depending upon the concurrence
of aggravating or mitigating circumstances:
1. If only one mitigating circumstance is present in the deed, the punishment prescribed by law shall be applied in its minimum degree.
2. If one aggravating circumstance is present, the punishment shall be applied in
its maximum degree.
However, in cases where the maximum degree is the death sentence, and only one
aggravating circumstance is present, the Courts, after considering the nature and
circumstances of the felony and of the perpetrator, may refrain from imposing the
death sentence.
A death sentence shall never be imposed due to the aggravation of a punishment
prescribed for a felony unless prescribed in this Code for such felony.
3. When both aggravating and mitigating circumstances concur, the punishment
shall be determined after reasonably weighing them in view of their relative importance.
4. In the absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the Courts shall
apply the punishment prescribed by law in the degree they consider adequate, in
view of the harm caused by the deed and the personality of the offender.
5. When two or more, or when one highly mitigating circumstance alone, concur
in the absence of aggravating ones, the Courts may impose a punishment one or two
grades lower than the one prescribed by law, in whatever degree they consider reasonable in view of the number and importance of such mitigating circumstances.
6. Regardless of the number and importance of aggravating circumstances, Courts
shall not impose a punishment higher than the one prescribed by law in its maximum
degree, unless the aggravating circumstance described in number 15, Article 10 is
present, in which case a punishment one or two grades higher shall be imposed,
starting with the second conviction for the same offense, to the extent they consider
reasonable.
7. Within the limits of each degree, the Courts in determining punishment shall
consider the number and importance of aggravating or mitigating circumstances and
the greater or less harm produced by the offense.
Article 62
If the punishment prescribed by law does not consist of three degrees, the Courts
shall apply the rules set forth in the preceding article, and shall divide the term of
each punishment in three equal parts, each constituting a degree.
Article 63
Courts may impose fines as widely as allowed by law, determining the amount not
only on the basis of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present in the deed, but
especially on the basis of the financial status or capabilities of the perpetrator.
*The provision refers to the complicated schemes and charts ruling the grades and
degrees of punishment which are contained in art. 68-79 of the Penal Code.

1968]

EXCESSIVE SENTENCES

APPENDIX B
EXAMPLEs OF GENERAL GuInELINus FOR SENTENCING

1. Provisions which express a preference for several theories of punishment: Section
81, DANIsH CRnvmWAL CODE:1A
In determining the penalty, account shall be taken, not only of the gravity
and dangerousness of the offense, but also of the previous record of the offender,
of his age and of his general conduct before and after the deed, of the persistence
of his criminal tendencies and of the motives underlying the act.
Article 79, GREEK PEN. CODE: 2 A
Judicial Calculationof the Punishment.
1. In the calculation of the punishment within the defined limits of the statute, the
court shall consider on the one hand, the quality of the act committed, and, on the
other hand, the personality of the offender.
2. In order to determine the gravity of the offense the court shall consider: (a) the
damage resulting from the offense, or the threatened danger; (b) the nature, the kind
and the purpose of the offense, as well as all factors accompanying its preparation or
commission, circumstances of time, place, means and manner; (c) the intensity of the
intention, or the grade of the negligence of the perpetrator.
3. In the evaluation of the personality of the offender the court weighs particularly
the degree of the criminal propensity of the perpetrator, as evidenced by the act, and
for a more precise determination thereof: (a) the reasons which prompted him to
commit the offense, the origin and the purpose which he sought; (b) his character,
and the grade of his development; (c) the individual and social circumstances and
his prior life; (d) his conduct during and after the act; especially his remorse and
his willingness to compensate for the harm he has inflicted.
4. The judgment shall state the reasons explaining the decision of the court for the
imposition of the sentence."
Articles 132, 133 ITALIAN PENAL CODES3A
Discretionary Powers of the Judge in Imposing the Punishment: Limits.
Within the limits established by law, the judge shall apply the punishment in his
discretion; he must state the grounds which justify the use of such discretionary power.
In increasing or reducing the punishment, the limits established for each kind of
punishment may not be exceeded, except in the cases expressly established by the law.
Gravity of the Crime: Valuation for the Purposes of Punishment.
In the exercise of the discretionary powers specified in the preceding Article, the
judge must take into account the gravity of the crime as inferred from:
(1) The nature, character, means, object, time, place and any other circumstances
of the act.
(2) The gravity of the harm or the danger caused to the person injured by the
crime.
(3) The intensity of criminal intent or the degree of culpable negligence.
The judge must also take into account the perpetrator's propensity for delinquency,
as inferred from:
(1) The motives to commit delinquency and the character of the offender.

IA.

GIEasING (transl.), THE DANIsHa C~mnNAL CODE 49 (1958).
2A. Loris (transl.), TIE GREEK PENAL CODE (mimeo. ed. 1962).
3A. Translated by the Comparative Criminal Law Project, per J. M. Canals.
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(2) The criminal and judicial precedents and, in general, the conduct and life of
the offender prior to the crime.
(3) The conduct contemporary with or subsequent to the crime.
(4) The individual, domestic and social conditions of life of the offender."

Article 54,

POLISH PENAL CODE:4A

The court shall impose penalty according to its discretion having regard primarily for the motives and the manner of acting of the offender, and his relation
to the person injured, to the degree of mental development and the character of
the offender, to his past life, and to his behavior after committing the offense.
Article 37, USSR CRIMnAL

CODE:5A

GeneralPrinciplesfor Assignment of Punishment.
The court shall assign punishment within the limits established by the articles of the
Special Part of the present Code which provide for responsibility for a committed
crime, in strict accordance with the provisions of the Fundamental Principles of
Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics and of the General Part of the
present Code. At the time of assigning punishment the court, guided by socialist legal
consciousness, shall take into consideration the character and degree of social danger
of the committed crime, the personality of the guilty person, and circumstances of
the case which mitigate or aggravate responsibility.
Article 38, YucosLAv CRIMINAL

CoDE:6A

For a particular criminal offence the Court shall fix the degree of punishment
within the limits provided by law for that offence, with due consideration for
all the circumstances influencing the punishment to be severer or milder (aggravating and extenuating circumstances), and especially, the degree of criminal
liability, the motives from which the offence was committed, the intensity of the
danger or wrong to the protected object, the circumstances under which the
offence was committed, the earlier life, the personal circumstances and the
behaviour of the offender after the commission of the criminal offence.
2. Provisions which consider retribution as the primary goal of punishment:
60, GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE: 7

Section

(1) The basis for fixing a punishment shall be the guilt of the perpetrator.
(2) In fixing a punishment the court shall weigh against each other such circumstances, other than definitional elements, as speak for and against the perpetrator.
Especially there shall be considered:
the
the
the
the
the
his

motives and aims of the perpetrator,
state of mind which the act bespeaks and the exercise of volition involved,
extent of breach of duty,
manner of perpetration and the wrongful effects of the act,
prior life of the perpetrator, his personal and economic circumstances, as well as
conduct after the act, especially his endeavor to make restitution.

4A. LmAmx & McDERm rorr (transl.), THE POLISH PENAL CODE of 1932 (1939).
5A. BERMA & SPINDLER (transl.), SovuEr CInvNAL LAW & PROCEDURE (1966).
6A. 10 THE NEW YUGOSLAV LAW (3-4) 17 (1959).
7A. Ross (transl.), THE GERMAN DRAFr PENAL CODE (1965).
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Article 63 Swiss CanvALz.

CODE:8A

Sec. 1. General Rules. ART. 63. The court shall mete out penalties in accordance
with the guilt of the offender, considering the motives, previous conduct and the
personal situation of the convicted person.
3. Provisions which consider correction (rehabilitation) as the primary goal of punishment:
9
Section 7, SWEDIsH PENAL CODE: A

In the choice of sanctions, the court, with an eye to what is required to maintain
general law obedience, shall keep particularly in mind that the sanction shall serve to
foster the sentenced offender's adaptation to society.

APPENDIX C
EXAMPLES OF PRovisIoNs

Section 17,

SOLELY STATING THE VARIOUS GOALS OF PUNISHMENT

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN

CRIMINAL

CODE:

0

A

1. The goal of punishment is:
(a) to make the enemy of the working people harmless;
(b) to prevent the offender from committing other offenses and to educate him
towards respecting the rules of socialist society;
(c) to contribute to the education of other members of society.
2. The execution of the punishment shall not lower human dignity.
Article 20, USSR

CRIMINAL CODE:ilA

Purposes of punishment. Punishment not only constitutes a chastisement for a
committed crime, but also has the purpose of correcting and re-educating convicted
persons in the spirit of an honorable attitude toward labor, of strict compliance with
the laws, and of respect toward socialist communal life; it also has the purpose of
preventing the commission of new crimes both by convicted persons and others.
Punishment does not have the purpose of causing physical suffering or the lowering
of human dignity.

APPENDIX D
EXTrnAcTs FROM DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NORWAY CONCERNING
SENTENCE REVIEW*

December 18, 1951 (Norsk Retstidende 1166 et seq.)
The defendant had been convicted of attempted homicide and sentenced to a term
8A. FmrmLANDER & GOLDBERG (transl.), THE Swiss FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, in
supplement to, 30 J. Caiu. L.C. & P.S. (1939).
9A. SE.uix (transl.), TnE PENAL CODE OF SwEDEN (1965).
10A. Translated from Scsmnx, supranote 13, at 216.
hA. BERMAN & SPIrNLER, supra note 5A, at 151.
*(The decisions were kindly made available to the authors by Prof. Johs. Andenaes,
a former Justice of the Supreme Court of Norway, and a member of the International
Advisory Board of the Comparative Criminal Law Project of New York University.)
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of imprisonment of one year and six months, less 154 days already spent in custody,
as well as deprivation of the right to hold office. He appealed on the ground that the
sentence was too severe.
From the opinion of the leading judge:
I believe the appeal should be granted.
The crime considered here is a very serious one, but in view of the fact that the
Jury found that the act was committed under especially mitigating circumstances and
during a strong reduction of the level of consciousness, c.f., the Penal Code, Section
56, No. lb, I consider a punishment of 1 year's imprisonment suitable. I also attach
importance to the fact that Johansen immediately after the act repented it, helped his
victim to bed, "stanched" the bleeding, lay down beside her and was lying crying
when people arrived. He attempted afterwards to commit suicide. The Court has
been informed that after hospitalization for about 14 days, the woman be stabbed was
discharged with a clean bill of health and has suffered no permanent injury. She has
not put in any request for prosecution.
The expert witnesses have found Johansen to be a person with inadequately developed
mental faculties, but the Jury has given a negative answer to the question whether
there is any danger that he may again commit an act as specified in Section 39 point 2
of the Penal Code. The Court has been informed that after being released from
custody he has again moved into the said woman's home and that it is his and the
woman's intention to marry as soon as the latter has obtained her divorce.
Under these circumstances and in view of the fact that Johansen is an able workman,
who works for the said woman and her children, whose home he has taken part in
rebuilding, I find compelling reasons for not sentencing him to serve a long term of
imprisonment. I find special grounds in the case for presuming that the execution of
the sentence is not necessary in order to keep Johansen from committing new offenses ...
Execution of the sentence was suspended.
September 8, 1959 (Norsk Retstidende 799 et seq.)
The defendant has been convicted of attempted rape and had been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of 3 years subject to deduction of one day for custody sustained.
He had appealed from the judgment on the ground that the sentence should have been
suspended.
From the opinion of the leading majority judge:
I have found the case extremely doubtful, but have come to the conclusion that it
is justifiable to apply a suspended sentence . . . Among the special reasons to which
I attach importance, I mention that Appellant, who is married and has two children
under age, has according to our information lived a normal married life, that he has
no previous convictions whatsoever, and that in general nothing discreditable is known
about him. These circumstances support the assumption, which also seems to be
upheld by the medical certificate produced in the Court: that the offense was committed on the spur of the moment, that it was an act of emotional excitement caused
by excessive alcohol consumption and committed during a consequent reduction of his
powers of judgment and ability to reason.
The execution of the sentence was suspended for a trial period of 2 years.
From the dissenting opinion:
In my opinion, considerations of general deterrence must weigh heavily in determining the punishment for a crime of this nature. In addition, it is only permissible, in
this case where the Code's minimum penalty is imprisonment for 3 years, to hand down
a suspended sentence when special reasons so indicate, ef. the Penal Code Section 52,
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No. 2., second paragraph. Although Appellant has no previous convictions, I cannot
find any such special reasons in the present case. Appellant is a married man of mature
age. As pointed out by the Court of Appeal, he showed considerable brutality during
the attempt at rape, and he did not abandon his attempt until his victim obtained
assistance. True, the execution of the sentence will have very serious consequences
for his family-wife and 2 boys, but I cannot find that these detrimental effects are
greater than must normally be expected from the serving of a prison sentence of such
long duration. Nor do I find it decisive that the punishment imposed is far higher
than that which I would have voted for under the general principles governing the
determination of sentences, if I had not been bound by the minimum penalty provided
by the Code. In my opinion, this should not lead to the conclusion that the entire
sentence be suspended.
From the conference I know that a majority of the Court are for allowing the
appeal, whereby the sentence will be suspended. If the appeal had been dismissed, I
would have recommended-as is the case quoted in Rt. 1959, pp. 43 et seq.-that the
punishment imposed be considerably reduced or in part suspended, by reprieve.
March 2, 1963 (Norsk Retstidende 231 et seq.)
Defendants had been convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year and three months, subject to deduction of 71 days of sustained
custody for each of them, as well as to pay compensation to the victim.
On the appeal of the Public Prosecutor, the sentence was converted to imprisonment
for two years and three months less 155 days of sustained custody.
From the majority opinion:
I come to the conclusion that the appeal ought to be allowed. It is true that the
prisoners are very young. However, this is a case of a carefully premeditated crime,
which has been planned and discussed by the prisoners for some time, and had been
carried out cynically and in cold blood according to the plan. The amount robbed was
considerable, as the offenders assumed it would be. The planning and execution of the
offence were particularly likely to attract attention notably among adventurous young
people; for that reason as well as the crime must be regarded as particularly dangerous
to the community. In these circumstances considerations of general deterrence weigh
heavily. The prisoners, both of whose intellectual qualifications and social environment
should have given them every reason to behave properly, have flagrantly failed to live
up to expectations.
April 6, 1963 (Norsk Retstidende 365 et seq.)
Defendant had been convicted of driving when under influence of alcohol and
sentenced to imprisonment for 21 days to be suspended subject to a trial period of two
years without probation, as well as a fine of Kr. 300.-or, if the fine was not paid, to
imprisonment for nine days. The local Chief of Police appealed against the sentence
on the ground that it should not have been suspended. The appeal was dismissed.
From the majority opinion:
Further, I attach importance to A's young age-as mentioned in the statement of
appeal he was 19 years and 4 months old at the time when the driving took placealthough this age is not so low that this fact alone would have been sufficient to justify
a suspension of the sentence. I also attach importance to the fact that A is at present
doing his military service which he commenced on January 10, 1963. If the prison
sentence is made non-suspended the effect will be either that he must leave his military
services in order to serve his sentence-with the result that his military service would
be extended accordingly-or that he would have to serve his sentence after the military
service has been completed in July, 1964.
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May 15, 1957 (Norsk Retstidende 541 et seq.)
Defendant bad been convicted of grand larcenies and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of 120 days, subject to deduction of 31 days for sustained custody.
Defendant appealed, on the ground that the sentence should have been suspended.
The Supreme Court decided to suspend the remaining punishment with a probation
period of two years.
From the majority opinion:
In considering the appeal, I have felt serious doubts, especially in view of the
fact that Appellant has on several previous occasions been guilty of similar offences,
that he has a previous conviction for robbery (Penal Code Section 267) and that the
conditions are now satisfied for applying a heavier punishment for repeated crimes
pursuant to the Penal Code Section 263, first paragraph. Nonetheless, I have come
to the conclusion that in view of the special circumstances in the case, it is justifiable
to let the execution of the prison sentence be suspended in accordance with the
Penal Code Sections 52 et seq. I have attached importance to the fact that the thefts
concerned very modest values, that most of the stolen objects have been returned to
their owner and that the offences are partly of a casual nature. Appellant's previous
convictions are not to my mind of decisive importance in view of the comparatively
long period of time-almost 6 years-that has passed since his last offence. Appellant has
been unemployed for some time when the offences were committed; he has not
obtained more permanent employment and one may suppose that the execution of the
sentence, by depriving him of his employment, would have a particularly serious effect
on himself, his wife and unsupported children. According to the information in the
case, there is reason to believe that Appellant has received a strong warning and that
he will now make a serious effort to mend his ways and not again come into conflict
with the criminal law. I find it reasonable that, under these circumstances, he be
given a last chance and I add that the Mayor of his home town has recommended this
in a letter dated to the Supreme Court dated March 12, 1957.

